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Partnerships in the provision of services by multi-agencies:  Four 
dimensions of service leadership and service quality 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between four key dimensions of service 
provision through adopting different partnership approaches. These 
dimensions are identified to describe partnerships as mandatory or voluntary 
and service provision based on contract or trust. Propositions about the 
nature and interaction of these variables are presented and combined as a 
heuristic suggesting complying, constraining and creating modes of 
partnership-working and service delivery.  Examples are provided of these 
modes in practice.  The paper concludes that this heuristic is a useful tool for 
practitioners to locate their form of partnership-based service delivery within 
the spectrum identified. 
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 The UK government has engaged since 1997 on a programme of 
‘modernising’ the provision of public services, predominately in areas of health 
and social care, education, local government and regeneration. The policy 
has aimed at bringing about a step-change in the quality of public services 
(Economist, 2005, Jas & Skelcher, 2005).  Such transformation has 
increasingly depended on organisations working together from across the 
public, private and voluntary sectors in partnerships.  The aim has been to 
increase service levels, including offering more choice in the nature of 
provision to citizens and to providers in the way they organise and manage 
resources.  The programme of changes has seen an increase in the level of 
government funding, structural changes and a greater involvement from the 
private and voluntary sectors in the provision of the services.  There has been 
much debate about the need to ‘join-up’ provision where a number of 
agencies are involved in one programme. For instance, child protection 
services involve agencies providing social care, education, health, housing 
and specific children’s charities. The complexity of these types of services to 
serve individuals and communities means that one monolithic organisation is 
unable to deliver everything.  Hence a number of organisations need to be 
involved in some form of relationship through which required services are 
identified, designed and delivered, i.e. partnership-working.  
 
‘Partnership’ is prominent in central and local government rhetoric in the UK 
(e.g. HM Treasury, 2000; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2001) and has 
been viewed as the route to joining-up and improving service provision.  A 
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consequence has been that many multi-agency partnerships are imposed on 
those organisations where they are under government control.  In this they 
differ from many business alliances where organisations have a choice of with 
whom to partner.  Nevertheless the potential of partnerships has been 
promoted within and between the private, public and voluntary sectors with 
authors often being willing to give prescriptions for success (e.g. Child & 
Mariotti, 1996; Clarke & Stewart, 1997; Wilson & Charlton, 1997; Faulkner, 
1998; Hutchinson & Campbell 1998; Dent, 1999; Smith, 1999).  But the 
practical challenges of effective partnership working have been well 
investigated and articulated by Huxham and co-workers in the context of 
collaborative working (Huxham, 1996; Huxham & Vangen, 2001, 2005).  They 
consider the potential difficulties of collaborative working such that other 
alternatives should be chosen in preference.   However once a decision has 
been made to collaborate there are suggestions to ensure success.  We 
consider that their studies demonstrate clearly that whilst the recent literature 
is rich in insight drawn from practical experience and contribute to a complex, 
paradoxical theoretical language of partnership theory there has been little 
progress towards a general theory of collaboration (by which we mean 
partnership working) since the work of Gray and Wood over a decade ago 
(Gray & Wood, 1991; Wood & Gray, 1991). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore approaches to partnership working 
from the literature and from the experience of a group of managers engaged 
in partnerships.  We investigate how partnership working practices might 
affect the way services are delivered.  We examine the influence of service 
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provision and how a balance between contract and trust affects the quality of 
services provided, mainly using the services literature and the reported 
performance of public services.  We draw primarily on the UK experience 
because of the high aspirations of the government to transform the quality of 
public services.  We also use our work over a four year period with managers, 
predominantly from the public sector in the UK, who are engaged in multi-
sector partnerships (Pettigrew 2003; Armistead, C. & Pettigrew, P. 2004: Pettigrew, 
2006).  We attempt to draw out implications for public service leadership in 
partnerships intent on transforming the quality of services they provide to 
citizens. 
 
 
The Quality of Public Services 
 
Public services in areas like health, education, social care and local 
government are complex.  In a democratic society citizens expect that the 
state will be involved in the provision of services through government policy, 
direct funding from taxes and control over the specification of service 
provision.  A government has a duty to respond and care for its citizens 
(Stewart & Walsh, 1989).  The extent to which the state is directly involved is 
influenced by beliefs in the use of public or private organisations as the main 
providers.  Citizens in the UK often have a low expectation of the quality of 
public services, sometimes based on direct or close experience or sometimes 
forensic media coverage of service failure.  For those responsible for the 
delivery of services there is the challenge of balancing the needs of the 
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individual and the collective needs of society.  It is more difficult in public than 
private services to make an assessment of needs and performance because 
of the greater number of interested parties i.e. stakeholders, including 
funders, politicians and service-users.  It is also more difficult because of the 
often complex overlapping if not conflicting policy objectives expected to be 
met from partnership-working. 
 
Just how these needs are determined has changed in the recent past, with 
moves to include citizens and service-users in the process to a greater extent, 
as seen for example in early initiatives under the banners of Citizen’s Charters 
in the UK (Morris & Haigh, 1996) and more recently public service guarantees 
in Sweden (Madell, 2005).  At the same time the recipients of public services 
have been viewed more as consumers and customers rather than patients, 
students and citizens. Charters or ‘entitlements’ offer statements of what they 
can expect in terms of choice, accessibility, information and responsibility, 
often expressed as forms of minimum standards and service agreements. 
These obligations have consequences for the extent to which failures result in 
the payment of compensation and legal redress.  
 
Government policy has been to set the targets for services including the 
quality of those services though public service agreements (PSA).  The 
judgement of the quality of provision relies heavily on a regime of regulation, 
audit and inspection (Boyne, Day & Walker, 2002) under schemes including 
Best Value Reviews, Public Service Benchmarking, Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment and the use of inspection agencies for local 
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government, education and health.  In the UK there are 13 inspectorates 
across education, health and social care, local government and criminal 
justice, with the National Audit Office having a remit across all areas of 
government expenditure.  The public sector has also sometimes borrowed 
from the private sector the use of business excellence models such as that 
developed by the European Foundation of Quality Management (EFQM), so 
that assessment is on the capability to deliver as much as on the results.  
However despite the use of all these tools the level of customer satisfaction 
with key public services has been at best been steady if not in decline 
(Cabinet Office, 2004). 
 
Defining factors of service quality in public services requires close attention to 
the specific nature of the service.  However, the determinants of public service 
quality fall within the sets of descriptors which have been identified by a range 
of authors in the services literature (e.g. Gremler, Bitner & Evans, 1994; 
Gronroos, 1984; Johnson, 1995; Parasuraman, 1985).  For the most part, 
these capture fairly generic factors such as availability, communication, 
reliability and responsiveness, which need to be defined more closely within 
the context of particular services.  Trying to identify the relative importance of 
one factor over another can be complex, not least because of the range of 
stakeholders who might make judgments on quality of service, but also 
reconciling the individual and collective needs. 
 
There has been wide debate about the extent to which target setting and an 
audit and inspection approach actually leads to improvement in service quality 
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in public services (Bouckaert & Peters 2002; Boyne, Day & Walker, 2002; van 
Thiel & Leeuw, 2002).  When resources are constrained, a concentration on 
particular targets can lead to poor performance in others.  Typically this 
occurs when a focus on increasing throughput and reducing costs lead to 
rushed, fragmented or incomplete service provision.  In a complex policy 
environment it can also lead to unintended consequences which then require 
to be addressed as a result of the initial and successive interventions (Jessop, 
2000).  This phenomenon can then lead to a blurring of the initial focus for the 
service and inexorably to inefficient, ineffective delivery. 
 
Approaches to Partnership 
 
Partnership working is hard. There are potential pitfalls in setting up, running 
and dissolving a multi-organisational partnership (Genefke & McDonald, 2001; 
Hall et al., 2002; Stuart, 2002; Sullivan & Skelcher 2002).  However, despite a 
raft of studies over the past 15 years, there is little effective guidance for 
emergent practice, taking account of the issues confronting partnership 
practitioners.  Only rarely can a template be invoked that will help resolve 
uncertainty, ambiguity and paradox, which can be considered the hallmark of 
this quintessential form of post-modern human institution. 
 
There have been many articles, books and training packages developed to 
assist organisations working in partnership.  Increasingly, government 
agencies have produced guidance, but they tend to be based on their own 
requirements rather than those of the partnership (Stewart et al., 2002). 
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Hutchinson & Campbell (1998) reviewed the literature for prescriptions on 
partnership-working and suggested that there is no easily transferable model 
of partnerships.  Nevertheless, the impression given is that there are plenty of 
prescribed recipes for effective partnership-working.  These refer to choosing 
the ‘right’ partners, agreeing strategy and objectives for the partnership, 
having the ‘right’ people involved with enabling resources, and finally to 
developing the ‘right’ processes for service provision and for monitoring 
performance.  
 
In the UK, many public sector service delivery partnerships result from 
government policy.  They are seen at all levels, for example between central 
government departments at the highest level to the local provision of services 
at the other end of the spectrum.  Frequently, the membership of partnerships 
is prescribed by government so that the major public sector agencies are 
required or clearly expected to participate.  When the intention is to bring 
about transformation through partnerships there are potential problems as 
Hastings (1996) has identified.  If one partner, perhaps under government 
policy pressure, tries to bring about change, this is often resisted by others. 
This unidirectional form of transformation is in sharp contrast to a sense of 
mutuality between organisations which consciously seek not only to influence 
others but are open to be influenced in transforming services for the ultimate 
benefit of users.   
 
There is undoubtedly some confusion about terms relating to partnership both 
within the literature and also among practitioners.  Terms such as networking, 
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partnerships, alliances, co-operation, collaboration and collaborative 
advantage are often used interchangeably and without clear distinction.  While 
some authors such as  Himmelman (1996) attempt a detailed taxonomy 
indicating successively more sophisticated degrees of engagement and 
commitment between organisations, others are happy to regard terms such as 
partnership and collaboration as being synonymous (Nissan and Burlingame, 
2003).  These terms can also be used ambiguously to describe a partnership 
either as an entity or a method of working (Hutchinson and Campbell, 1998).  
This is a very important issue for the kinds of ‘partnerships’ with which we are 
concerned.  We suggest it is important to distinguish between partnerships as 
entities with recognised structures of governance and inter-organisational 
working practices between agencies which may be collaborative in nature 
without necessarily constituting a partnership as such.  Nevertheless, many 
collaborations in British public life are labelled ‘partnerships’ even with no 
governance infrastructure in place and only a limited degree of genuine 
interaction involving joint planning and resourcing and service processes.  
This, in our view, diminishes the term ‘partnership’ as if it only has to be 
declaimed in order to exist, when in reality real partnerships may take some 
time, shared experience and no little pain before becoming effective 
(Pettigrew, 2006). 
 
Senior managers in public sector agencies are often required or are expected 
to be members of a large number of partnerships.  We have found from the 
experience of managers who are involved in a wide range of partnerships a 
variety of reasons for failure, including: 
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 • Gaps in the organisational membership required for the purpose of the 
partnership (often private businesses in public sector-led partnerships) 
• Unwilling participant organisations and senior managers ‘just turning 
up’ through a sense of duty rather than being actively involved 
• Conflicting and sometimes hidden agendas, goals and targets between 
participant organisations and the partnership 
• Conflicting allocation of resources/funding between partnerships where 
one organisation or agency is a member of each (or several) 
partnerships competing for resources/funding 
• Hostility or suspicion about knowledge sharing between agencies 
• Conflicting professional cultures and practices in the participating 
agencies (e.g. between health and social care) 
• Inadequate resources available to support and sustain the work of the 
partnership 
• Power struggles between member organisations within the partnership 
• A history of previous difficult relationships between partners (Author, 
2003) 
 
When partnerships are imposed on managers, for instance by government 
mandate,  there may be a tendency to try to make the partnership work by 
following a set of prescriptions or check lists which might satisfy government, 
but which fail to address the dynamics of partnership performance and the 
causes of partnership failure.  Mandated partnerships can address issues of 
governance in an ambiguous way which may do little to promote collaboration 
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between partners.  Public sector managers with considerable experience in 
partnership working view good partnership as involving a process which 
seeks to draw the best from each organisation in the partnership through 
gaining the active involvement of senior managers, i.e. a more empowered 
approach to partnerships (Armistead & Pettigrew, 2004).  These usually have 
a strong integrated governance structure alongside an approach to 
partnership-working that engenders active collaboration through identification 
with the partnership’s objectives and ethos and an alignment between the 
organisation and the partnership through a process of mutual adjustment.  
This process is referred to in the collaboration literature as ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
In Table 1 we have attempted to identify some of the characteristic of a 
mandated as distinct from a voluntary approach to partnership. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Clearly we are emphasising here the contrast between mandatory and 
voluntary constructs while recognising that many partnerships will display 
aspects of each at different times.  However, our experience is that a 
particular partnership can be characterised as being related more to one of 
these dimensions than the other at any given point in time. 
 
Delivery of Services: Contract v Trust 
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Many public services are complex in their delivery and increasingly involve a 
number of organisations across sectors in order to meet quality standards and 
targets.  We have already seen that partnerships are a common framework 
for bringing organisations together to develop strategies and/or for deploy 
services.  More often than not one or more of the partners are ‘bankers’ who 
will allocate funding for service delivery.  A variety of mechanisms are 
employed to allocate funding which include payment based on formal 
contracts or against annual approved plans.  These are formal arrangements 
including agreed service level agreements.  On their own these arrangements 
rely on working to the detail of the agreement for their success.  They are not 
good, however, for capitalising on informal arrangements which can generate 
value through goodwill,  good working relations, and allowing creative 
avenues to be explored.  Here success is likely to depend as much on the 
degree to which there is trust between individuals and hence their 
organisations.  
 
As a working definition of trust we use: ‘Trust is one party’s willingness to be 
vulnerable to another party based on a belief that the other party is, 
competent, open, concerned and reliable’ (Mishra, 1996).  We recognise that 
the level of trust is influenced by prior experience, a calculated assessment of 
the other party or intuition (Coulson, 1998).  The way individuals behave in 
situations where they might choose to collaborate or not for their own 
advantage when there is no contractual relationship has been explored in the 
context of the prisoner’s dilemma by Axelrod (1984). He demonstrated that in 
the short term the tendency is for people not to behave collaboratively.  
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However, when a relationship extends over time there is greater potential for 
mutual gains from collaboration.  We can see this effect being influenced by 
the ‘shadow of the future’ where each party assesses the risk of defecting 
from a relationship.  Breaking trust will probably bring retaliation from the 
other party leaving both parties worse off than if they continued collaborating.  
However, we need to recognise that moving towards collaboration can also be 
influenced by previous contact between the two parties, i.e. the shadow of the 
past (Pettigrew, 2003, 2006). In some cases this prior experience can make a 
trusting collaborative relationship very difficult to achieve in the short term. 
 
In the services literature there is evidence that the level of service 
performance is influenced by the extent to which relationships between 
parties involved in service provision are based predominately on contract or 
trust (Coulson, 1998).  Relying on contract accepts the requirement to specify 
precisely the nature of service provision and the levels of service required by 
way of service level agreements and to devise effective monitoring systems. 
Trust relies on service professionals using their knowledge to work 
collaboratively to develop processes and systems and appropriate process 
measures to deliver agreed levels of service.  Distinctions between these 
different forms of relationship are shown in Table 2. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Again we are here emphasising the contrast between the constructs while 
recognising that many partnerships will display aspects of each in terms of the 
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nature of the service, culture and precedent, and the way in which individuals 
and organisations relate.  However, our experience is that service provision in 
partnerships can typically be characterised as being reliant more on contract 
than trust.  This is especially true where partnerships are mandated rather 
than voluntary and where large sums of (possibly) pooled budgets are being 
dispersed or expended. 
 
Combining Approaches to Partnership and Service Provision 
 
Our exploration of approaches to partnership-working and how service 
provision might be influenced by aspects of contract and trust lead us to 
consider how the two constructs might be related.   
 
Our starting point was four propositions developed from the preceding 
sections, namely: 
 
Proposition 1 – Service provision based on mandatory partnerships is less 
likely to deliver service quality to satisfy end users 
 
Proposition 2 – Service provision based on voluntary partnerships is more 
likely to deliver service quality to satisfy end users 
 
Proposition 3 – Service provision based on contract is less likely to deliver 
service quality to satisfy end users 
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Proposition 4 – Service provision based on trust is more likely to deliver 
service quality to satisfy end users 
 
We have combined these propositions into a heuristic for service provision by 
partnerships shown in Figure 1 which relate approaches to partnership-
working and the basis for service provision.    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
It seems to us that the three areas in the diagram express the characteristics 
of the environment of service provision which we have seen in multi-sector 
partnerships.   Our assigned descriptions of each area attempt to capture the 
environment in which decisions and actions take place.  More detailed 
characterisation of each is contained in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Our proposition is that the three positions have strengths and weaknesses: 
 
(a) Complying, where contract takes precedence over trust and is more 
mandatory than voluntary 
 
This may be acceptable at one end of the scale, for simple commissioned 
services which require little direct contact between commissioner and 
commissioned.  However, it may also apply in highly complex, financially or 
politically risk-laden situations where reliance on trust is deemed insufficient to 
protect the partners.  There may be risks of service failure deriving from the 
lack of trust between senior managers and staff in the participating 
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organisations, particularly when things go wrong and the parties resort to 
blaming each another.  The end users of the service are often not considered 
in such situations as the partners’ energies are focused on resolving issues 
between them. 
 
A good example of this kind of arrangement between parties is the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK, a form of public-private partnership.  It is 
particularly employed for projects that are large, costly and complex, involving 
significant capital works, on-going maintenance and sometimes facility 
management (HM Treasury, July 2003).  They may not be mandatory as a 
matter of principle but become so once the partners agree on a PFI solution in 
the sense of having to conform to the rules for these specific forms of 
partnership laid down by Government. 
 
The style of partnership in this case is strictly hierarchical and market-driven, 
with the public sector (usually Central or Local Government or Government 
agencies) entering into long-term arrangements (typically 20-30 years) with a 
private sector consortium.  The latter may comprise a number of equity 
investors who raise finance for the project and which then sub-contracts the 
construction, maintenance and service provision.  The public sector then pays 
annuities to the consortium providing a commercial return on their investment.  
This form of arrangement has delivered over 600 operational new public 
facilities in the UK, including hospitals, schools and roads. 
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The value to the public sector is that it can take full advantage of the private 
sector’s perceived project management, innovation, design and risk 
management skills, justifying the extra cost of raising money from private 
sources as opposed to the cost of Government borrowing.  This kind of 
arrangement involves significant transaction costs owing to the reliance on 
complex, detailed contracts and sub-contracts in which risk is apportioned.  
The object is to leave little or nothing to trust as the complexity and risk is 
considerable.  Contracts are as water-tight as possible and disputes are 
resolved with reference to legal obligations.  Thus, this type of public-private 
partnership is not suitable in cases where the transaction costs are a 
considerable proportion of the value of the project.  Hence, they are most 
often used for expensive multi-million pound capital projects. 
 
(b) Constraining, where trust and contract are balanced and which could 
be mandatory or voluntary or both 
 
Constraining partnerships imply a balance between trust and contract, and 
those that are voluntary or mandated.  There may be creative processes 
underlain by contractual obligations.  These partnerships offer scope for 
design and development within these broad parameters and may be a staging 
point in moving towards more compliant or creative forms.  They may hold 
back the development of responsive service quality because the partnership 
demonstrates only a partial progression from a mandatory approach to one of 
empowerment. On the other hand they may demonstrate travel in the 
opposite direction, possibly as a result of a breakdown of trust or service 
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failure.  Some partners may be more trusting of some than others.  Overall 
service provision may be defined by reliance on contract in at least some 
areas.  Recipients of the service may perceive the service provision as 
fragmented and not joined-up when several different organisations are 
involved.  On the other hand the partners may enjoy freedom to design 
services to respond to the specific needs of clients within broadly defined 
contracted targets. 
 
Good examples of this type of partnership in England are Education Business 
Link Consortia.  There are 47 of these in England and they provide a formal 
structure for local education business link providers to work together in the 
planning and delivery of work-related learning in support of the school 
curriculum.  The aim is to give young people practical experience of the world 
of work and help them to understand how their learning is essential for their 
entry into the workforce.  Consortia provide in addition a single point of 
contact for local employers who wish to help young people develop their 
potential through links with business. 
 
Although a voluntary service for many years previously, since September 
2004 there has been a statutory requirement that all young people aged 14-16 
years should experience work-related learning as part of a broad and 
balanced curriculum.   
 
Currently consortia are variously constituted, from charitable trusts to private 
companies, and rely primarily on funding through the Learning and Skills 
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Council (LSC), a Government agency responsible for planning and funding 
post-16 learning in England up to Higher Education level.  This funding allows 
a range of programmes to be undertaken by consortia, including student work 
experience placements, teacher placements into business and work-related 
learning opportunities for young people.   
 
Consortia are accountable under contract to the LSC for the activities it funds 
and related targets, but are generally free to allocate funding within global 
budget allocations to each consortium member to undertake specific activities.  
This allows consortia members to be creative and share experience and skills 
among its members, with the LSC contract only specifying outputs and 
budgets rather than prescription on methodology.  For example, some 
consortia develop a portfolio of ‘products’ derived from their members based 
on the headline requirements of the LSC contract.  Schools choose which of 
these to buy from the consortium and resources are then allocated on a 
demand-led basis to successful consortium members.  Thus consortium 
members can be both partners and competitors. 
 
This particular example illustrates a form of partnership operating at the 
creative end of the restraining spectrum, but inevitably the variegated 
governance structures and processes within consortia may lead to variable 
performance and there may be pressure from contracting agencies, such as 
in this case the LSC, to ‘standardise’ delivery methods and forms of 
governance.  This may improve the consistency of service across the country 
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and be easier to manage from the funder’s viewpoint, but may in so doing 
lose the flexibility to respond to needs in a particular area. 
 
 
 
 
(c) Creating, where trust takes precedence over contract   
 
Creating suggests an active involvement of a range of partners to develop 
and deliver service provision which is responsive to the needs of 
beneficiaries.  While there may be formal contracts between parties the 
quality of their working relationship to provide services is based on trust, 
which allows good collaborative working.  Relationships are altogether much 
more complex and difficult to characterise than in the simple contract 
situation.  There may be close interactions with key individuals working in a 
network who socially construct meaning from their shared experience as well 
as in designing and delivering services.  Creativity is linked to service 
provision being highly responsive and sensitive to changing needs and 
demands.  However, there may be a danger of over-optimism especially in 
terms of constraints on funding, possible breakdown of trust and unforeseen 
disputes based on service design specification, aspects of delivery, or inter-
professional rivalry, misunderstanding, and differing or conflicting forms of 
response. 
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A good example of this genre of partnership are mental health partnerships in 
the UK, which generally involve some form of collaboration between Social 
Services Departments in local authorities and NHS Mental Health Trusts.  It 
has become increasingly recognized that for adult mental health services a 
joint and integrated approach to mental health services can deliver a number 
of benefits to service users, for example by having one gateway to access 
services through a single community mental health team.  They can often be 
a stepping stone on the pathway towards specialist expanded Mental Health 
Trusts but stop short of the formal legal and accountability framework that is 
required under Section 31 of the Health Act, 1999. 
 
The style of these partnerships tends to be underpinned by an overall 
commitment from partners to improve services through integrated line 
management in order to avoid parallel, and possibly, conflicting services to 
this particularly vulnerable client group.  There is no contract and delivery is 
usually flexible and tailored to their needs of service users so that they are 
unaware of any professional or organisational differences between the service 
deliverers.  Thus, these partnerships are entirely voluntary, although there are 
often professional cultural obstacles between health and social services 
personnel to be overcome in order to make services effective. 
 
There are usually shared but distinct organisational budgets, and the form of 
collaborative arrangement is often encouraged by shared national and local 
delivery targets where each organisation’s achievements can contribute to the 
other’s.   
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 Such creative partnerships are generally set within a governance framework 
that suits local need.  This model will typically include: 
 
• A joint Management Board that oversees the operational management 
of joint health and social care teams 
 
• A joint Strategy and Performance Board with a performance 
management function 
 
• Integrated locality management arrangements with jointly appointed 
managers from health and social services. 
 
A benefit of voluntary, creative partnerships of this type is the opportunity for 
issues to come to the fore and be addressed productively prior to formal legal 
partnerships.  In the case of mental health integrated partnerships the 
following partnership aspects have emerged as opportunities for learning and 
reframing prior to entering into formal agreements: 
 
• Leadership 
• Human Resources 
• Financial Systems 
• Information Systems 
• Evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness 
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Conclusion 
 
We have attempted in this paper to provide a heuristic to help partnership 
practitioners and service providers understand where their provision fits along 
the four dimensions of mandated or voluntary partnerships, and whether 
through trust or contract.  We believe this model, whilst a simplification of 
reality, allows practitioners to map their own partnerships and services and 
suggest directions of travel.  In the current political climate in Britain, where 
bureaucracy is widely seen as a curse on efficient and effective service 
provision, efforts to streamline services based on trust more than contract are 
seen as desirable and necessary. Severe pressure on public service budgets 
in health, social care, education and regeneration tend to accelerate this 
process. Whilst we recognise that particular forms of partnership fall naturally 
into one or more of our theoretical forms (e.g. PFIs),  we believe that generally 
partnerships based on trust rather than mandate are more likely, given time to 
mature, to deliver the more effective, joined-up services that citizens demand.  
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We would trust that our model assists policy-makers in making judgements 
against the direction of travel a particular partnership should take to become 
more effective 
 
Partnerships and the needs of service users are dynamic and so we believe 
that our model needs to be seen in this way.  Sometimes it may be necessary 
to choose a particular combination within the locus of the four dimensions to 
suit prevailing circumstances.  It may be necessary, therefore, to institute 
mandated contracted services over voluntary relationships based on trust 
within service partnerships. This may be necessary, for example, in the case 
of a collapse in service delivery where authoritarian intervention is required to 
avoid hardship.  However, our general belief is that wherever possible service 
partnerships should be striving to build voluntary relationships and build trust 
over time, as this is the most sustainable way for services to be delivered to 
suit local needs.   
 
To be successful, however, Government of one form or another has to create 
a trusting environment that eschews a blame culture when things go wrong 
(as they will at some time) and instead encourages stability and learning.  
Thus, politicians should not be tempted to punish those that falter or over-rely 
on inspection and audit processes to protect themselves from political 
embarrassment, but do little for the prospect of achieving long term 
improvement in the effectiveness of service delivery.  A more mature 
understanding of the inherently complex and sometimes chaotic nature of 
public service delivery by partnerships would, in our view, help considerably in 
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supporting and sustaining effective delivery. We hope that the ideas 
presented in this paper will assist in this understanding. 
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TABLE 1: Mandatory and voluntary approaches to partnership  
 
Mandatory Partnerships Voluntary Partnerships 
Ambiguous governance and  
accountabilities between partnership 
and imposer/funder. 
Clear local governance and 
accountabilities. 
Ambiguity over central v local 
concerns and priorities. 
Focus on locally agreed priorities. 
Compromise the most likely route to 
agreement. 
Consensus the most likely route to 
agreement. 
Often an extension of state power 
and control. 
Expression of desire for local power 
and control even if in conflict with 
the state. 
‘Tick box’ approach to structure and 
process. 
Creative, extemporised approaches 
to structure and process. 
Partners specified by funder; limited 
scope for change. 
Partners join voluntarily on basis of 
predicted partnership synergy and 
organisational benefits with easy 
access for those who want to 
contribute. 
‘Partners’ have limited identity with 
the ‘partnership’. 
Partners feel sense of ownership of 
the partnership. 
Tend to last only as long as the 
funding. 
More sustainable, as long as funding 
sources derived from partners are 
 33
maintained. 
Leadership assumed to rest with a 
lead partner, often the ‘banker’ 
specified by the funder, particularly if 
central government. 
Leadership decided by partners.  
More diffused and distributed 
approaches explored. 
Tends to be high-level and strictly 
tiered. 
Multi-tiered, but with more flexibility. 
Outputs and outcomes strictly defined 
and measured. 
Less rigour in measuring outputs 
and outcomes and less initial target 
setting. 
Goals, strategy, plans, objectives and 
targets specified by funder. 
Goals, strategy, plans, objectives 
and targets less well specified; 
conflicts between organisational 
goals and cultures explored 
multilaterally. 
Resources specified and subject to 
strict financial control. 
Creative resourcing is the norm with 
more flexible allocation of resources 
and more efforts to seek synergy 
among the partners. 
Partnership processes follow the 
prescriptions set by the funder. 
Processes less well specified and 
articulated; more reliance on 
informal understandings. 
Reliant on the traditional skills of 
professionals. 
Reliant on the skills of ‘boundary 
spanners’, ‘political entrepreneurs’ 
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and ‘mavericks’. 
Hierarchy relatively more important 
than network. 
Network relatively more important 
than hierarchy.                                     
Nature of reality is a ‘given’, 
prescribed by authority. 
Nature of reality is more socially 
constructed. 
Traditional professional competencies 
are maintained with ‘partnering skills’ 
assumed. 
New ways of working across 
organisations and traditional skill 
sets are explored.  Practitioners 
encouraged to learn about 
partnership working. 
Performance is closely monitored. Informal assessment and judgement 
more important than formal 
mechanisms. 
Transformational possibilities are 
largely unidirectional (Hastings, 
1996). 
Possibilities may include mutual 
transformation. 
Partnership is overtly political and 
public. 
Partnership is less political and less 
public. 
 
 
TABLE 2:  Contrast between service provision based on contract or 
trust 
 
Service provision relying on Service provision relying on Trust 
 35
Contract 
Detailed specification of how service 
will be delivered. 
Emphasis on service outcomes, 
leaving delivery to be designed by 
contractor. 
Emphasis on quantified measures of 
service outcomes. 
Quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. 
Based on ‘tried and tested’ 
experience. 
Open to discussion, mutually agreed 
from outset. 
Inflexible even if circumstances 
warrant variation in practice. 
Flexible, open to variation based on 
experience in delivery. 
Resolution of service failure based on 
contract specification underpinned by 
contract law. 
Service failure seen as opportunity for 
both parties to collaborate to solve 
issues for the benefit of service users.
Needs of service-users seen as less 
important than adherence to the 
contract. 
Needs of service-users have primacy 
over contract. 
Mutual learning limited by reliance on 
contract. 
Mutual learning enhanced by focus 
on developing trusting relationships 
between contractor and contractee. 
Professional judgement limited by 
exigencies of the contract. 
Professional judgement valued within 
relationship between contractor and 
contractee. 
Short-term thinking: win or lose. Longer-term relationship building 
win/win. 
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Subject to expensive legal dispute 
over perceived non-compliance. 
Contract seen as ‘back stop’ with 
conflict resolution negotiated within 
on-going relationship. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Service Provision by Partnerships 
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